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1

Introduction

The international market for crude oil is exposed to price risk. The latter can affect the
economic performance of a large number of oil companies. Therefore commercial firms
hedge against oil price volatility by taking part of the oil futures markets. The risk premium arises because hedger offers to speculator (the counterparty side to the derivative
contract) a monetary reward for non-diversifiable risk in the crude oil markets.
This paper emphasises the importance of the risk premium for two main reasons. First, it
represents the opportunity cost that is accrued to commercial firms for hedging purposes.
Second, it is an attractive investment return for oil speculators. This is motivated by
the inflow of capital into crude oil futures markets from commodity index traders, also
known as index funds. The latter are economic agents who wish to gain exposure to the
oil futures price without holding the commodity in the physical market.
On a practical level institutional investors sell financial instruments in the over-the-counter
(OTC) markets to commodity index traders. Therefore money managers who provide suitable instruments that replicate returns of commodity price indices hedge themselves by
entering long in the oil futures markets.
The following strategy can have impacts on the crude oil risk premium as discussed in
Hamilton and Wu (2014). The authors show empirical evidence of a structural change in
the average and the volatility of the risk premium in the crude oil futures contracts as a
significant effect of the inflow of money from index traders.
In this paper we investigate the interaction between unexpected changes in the economic
fundamentals of the global market for crude oil and oil risk premium at the aggregate
level.
The methodology is based on a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (BSVAR) model
as discussed in Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b). Relative to the existent literature on
oil risk premium this work provides three main contributions.
First, it offers an empirical evidence on whether compensation for risk required by oil
speculators depends on the type of structural shock in question. We document a negative
relationship between the impact responses of the price of oil and the risk premium to
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shocks of the economic fundamentals in the global oil market. This finding is consistent
with theoretical framework based on the hedging pressure theory, the limits to the arbitrage theory and further considerations that will be presented and argued in this analysis.
Moreover understanding the response of oil risk premium to unexpected changes in the
price of oil is useful for some class of investors, such as speculators who usually take long
positions in the oil futures markets.
This analysis addresses some research questions, among which: What is the relationship
between crude oil risk premium and unexpected rise in the price of oil? On average, what
should speculators expect to receive as a compensation for the risk they are taking on?
Second, this work provides a specific investigation for the risk premium in the crude oil
market as opposed to most of the empirical analysis based on a ”portfolio approach”.
Understanding the economic factors driving the overall rate of return from a financial
commodity portfolio (or index) can be misleading on several aspects.
First of all, the commodity index cannot be a good proxy for the performance of a single
asset class as referred to crude oil. For example, the Standard and Poor’s-Goldamn Sachs
Commodity Index (SP-GSCI) represents the main benchmark for investment in the commodity markets but the share of crude oil futures contracts is only a fraction (about 40%)
of its whole composition. For other indices like the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index
(DJ-UBSCI) the total energy weight amounts to 30%. Moreover the weighting scheme of
a commodity index might change over time.
Third, the choice of the econometric framework allows us to deal with reverse causality
and consider the endogeneity of the crude oil risk premium with respect to macroeconomic
and global oil market variables. This methodology is widely used in the empirical works
for modelling the global price of crude oil, see Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2014);
Kilian and Lee (2014).
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes data and it offers stylised facts on the crude oil futures market. Section 4
discusses the methodology. Empirical results are presented in section 5. Finally, section
6 offers some conclusions.

2
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2

Literature Review

According to the theory of normal backwardation proposed by Keynes (1930); Hicks (1939)
and Kaldor (1939), on average the aggregate short hedging demand for futures outweighs
the long hedging demand. As a result, to entice speculator to take a long side of the
contract the crude oil futures price should be set below the expected future spot price.
For example the empirical analysis discussed in Bessembinder (1992); Bessembinder and
Chan (1992) and De Roon and Veld (2000) find out that on average positive excess returns
from holding futures contracts are correlated when hedgers are net short. Consistent with
these findings Hong and Yogo (2012) show that the hedging pressure is an important
determinant of crude oil risk premium.
In contrast, other studies such as Chang (1985) and Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012) do not
provide robust results in linking the risk premium to position of speculators and hedgers.
Gorton et al. (2013) and Alquist and Gervais (2013) highlight that changes in the net
positions of oil traders do not predict oil prices movements. Conversely, the authors show
that changes in oil prices help to predict changes in traders’ positions on the oil futures
market.
Recently, index speculators have been exposed to commodity indices within a context of
a portfolio diversification as discussed in Cheng and Xiong (2014).
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) show that commodity futures returns derived from an
equally-weighted index are low correlated with stocks and bonds but positively correlated
with changes in inflation.
Hamilton and Wu (2014) propose a model describing the relationship between hedging
demand from commercial producers, financial investors and the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium requires that the expected returns of futures prices depend on the arbitrageurs’
net exposure to non-diversifiable risk in the crude oil market.
The authors show that after 2005, the index-fund traders have considerably reduced the
average level of the crude oil risk premium.
Studies by Irwin and Sanders (2012); Brunetti et al. (2013); Sanders and Irwin (2014);
Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) investigate the role of speculation by exploiting the relation-

3
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1228

6

Valenti et al.: Interpreting the Oil Risk Premium: do Oil Price Shocks Matte

ship between commodity index positions and the path of prices in energy futures markets.
In these works the authors conduct traditional time-series statical test with mixed results
to provide evidence of predictive link between commodity index investment and changes
in energy futures prices. The empirical design behind this literature suffers from some
limitations. First, these studies refer to a wide basket of commodities rather than the
single market of crude oil. Second, these works treat position from the commodity index
traders as exogenous to changes in futures prices leading to downward-biased estimates.
Third, Granger-causality test says nothing about the causal relationship between futures
prices and index speculators.
Another view consists of a link between the risk premium and the benefit derived of holding oil stocks. This economic view is typically based on the theory of storage.
As discussed in Gorton et al. (2013) and Erb and Campbell (2006) the convenience yield
can be interpreted as a risk premium linked to the level of inventories which might be able
to explain the term structure of the crude oil futures curve. As a result, higher levels of
oil stocks might cause a reduction of the risk premium because the risk of stock-outs falls.
Empirical studies conducted by Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Valenti (2017) highlight
that the oil futures-spot spread can be used as a proxy for the convenience yield but expressed with an opposite sign. The first investigation shows that the futures-spot spread
is highly correlated with the cumulative effect of the real price of oil to precautionary
demand shocks. The latter are identified from the oil market VAR model as discussed in
Kilian (2009).
Valenti (2017) adopts a revised version of the model proposed by Kilian and Murphy
(2014) and he shows that most of the fluctuations in the oil futures-spot spread can be
explained by shocks to aggregate demand.
Alternative methodologies based on volatility models confirm that the rises of the crude
oil risk premium are associated with higher price volatility in the underlying asset, see
Moosa and Al-Loughani (1994) and Considine and Larson (2001).
Pindyck (2001) argues that holding a commodity alone entails risk because the spot price
of crude oil might covary positively with the global economy. Therefore the holders of a
commodity will be rewarded for that risk in term of oil spot prices greater than relative
4
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current futures prices.
Finally, the crude oil futures risk premium might be also affected by macroeconomic
factors. For example, Coimbra and Esteves (2004) find positive correlation between oil
futures forecast errors and market expectation errors on economic activity at the world
level. Pagano and Pisani (2009) highlight the importance of the US business-cycle indicators to end up with precise estimates of oil futures prices adjusted for the risk premium.
Analogously, Alquist et al. (2014) and Heath (2016) show that unspanned macroeconomic
factors help to explain the behaviour of the crude oil risk premium.
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3

Data and stylised facts on the crude oil futures
market

The data we use in this work are monthly and cover the period 1983:4-2016:4. In this
analysis two types of variables are employed: the global oil market variables and the oil
risk premium predictors.
The former consist of data on production and price of the international market for crude oil
available from the website of the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The global oil
production is expressed in percent changes while the physical price is the refiner acquisition
cost of crude oil imports. In order to capture the global demand for industrial commodities
we consider the real economic activity index proposed by Kilian (2009).
The oil risk premium represents the predictable pay-off of an oil futures contract held to
maturity. As opposed to the previous variables crude oil risk premium is not observable
and it must be estimated from the data. Therefore to derive the monthly realized excess
return we use three months futures contracts price as the end-of-month value and close
daily spot price traded on WTI market.
As regards the set of risk premium predictors we include both macroeconomic and financial
data. Table 1 reports a summary of the explanatory variables used for the estimation of
the risk premium.
We use changes of the US consumer price index to derive a monthly measure for annual
inflation rate (inf ). Some empirical studies find out that the expected (ei) and unexpected
(ui) component of the inflation rate is positively correlated with prospective returns of a
commodity futures investment. This is consistent with the view that investors use crude
oil futures contracts to hedge against inflation risks.
Following Casassus and Collin Dufresne (2006) we consider a proxy for the slope of the
yield curve in order to capture the relationship between the US government bond and
crude oil market. We refer to the change in the term structure yield curve (cts) which
is defined as the difference between the 10-Year Treasury constant maturity rate and the
Treasury Bill of maturity 3-months.
Variation in liquidity plays an important role in explaining the factor structure of the
6
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Table 1: List of predictors for the estimation of the risk premium
Id
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Predictors
inf
ei
ui
cts
cdp
jbp
cli
cip

Descriptions
Annual CPI inflation rate
Expected US inflation
Unexpected US inflation
Change in the term structure yield curve
Change in the default premium
Junk bond premium
Composite leading indicator
Annual changes of U.S industrial production index

global business cycle and it can be correlated with the risk premium. Therefore the
analysis takes into account other two indicators. The first is the change in default premium
(cdp) defined as the difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and 10-year
treasury constant maturity rate. The second indicator is called junk bond spread (jbs)
and is measured as the difference between Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields rated by
Moody.
Moreover empirical results of Pagano and Pisani (2009) suggest that the risk premium in
the commodity markets can be strongly affected by fluctuations in the business cycle of
the global economy. Therefore this analysis includes the composite leading indicator (cli)
and the yearly changes in the US industrial production index (cip).

3.1

The estimation of the crude oil risk premium

The oil risk premium represents the average returns that long investors expect to receive
as a reward for non-diversifiable risk in the crude oil futures market. The risk premium
is not observable but it can be estimated from the data. In this analysis we follow two
different methodologies.
The first approach relies on a multivariate linear regression model. The second method
is based on a Gaussian affine term-structure model in which time-varying crude oil risk
premium depends on three latent factors. The first two factors are identified as the level
and the slope of the term structure futures curve while the last can be though as a proxy
for measurement error.
Regarding the first methodology we define the realized log-returns of a crude oil futures


investment as ert+3 = ln SFt+3
where Ft,3 denotes the price of futures contract at the end
t,3
7
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of the day of month t (with maturity 3-months) and St+3 is the corresponding realized
daily spot price at the next 3-months from period t.
The oil risk premium regression can be expressed as follow:

ert+3 = α +

K
X

βi zit + νt+3

for t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(1)

i=1

where zit represents the i explanatory variable at time t, α and βi represent the 3months specific regression coefficients which can be consistently estimated by ordinary
least squares and K is the total number of explanatory variables. Finally νt,t+3 is the
mean zero error term of the risk premium regression model. Fitted values of 1 represent
consistent estimates of time-varying risk premium.
In this analysis we include four different measures of crude oil risk premium in order to
assess the robustness of the empirical results. We estimate the first-three risk premium
measures as follow:

(1)

ˆ t+3 = α̂ + β̂1 inft + β̂6 jbpt + β̂7 clit
rpt+3 ≡ er

for t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(2)

(2)

for t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(3)

(3)

for t = 1, 2, . . . , T

(4)

ˆ t+3 = α̂ + β̂3 uit + β̂4 ctst + β̂7 clit
rpt+3 ≡ er

rpt+3 ≡ er
ˆ t+3 = α̂ + β̂2 eit + β̂5 cdpt + β̂8 cipt

Although the risk premium regression analysis is widely accepted in the academic literature some concerns might arise about the selection criteria of the exogenous variables.
Therefore we provide an alternative estimate of risk premium based on oil futures prices,
only. This approach stems from an affine factor structure model as developed by Hamilton
and Wu (2014).
The authors propose a model of the time-varying risk premium that imposes an affine
factor structure which is common for oil futures prices and the economic fundamentals of
the global market for crude oil.

8
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The risk premium is identified by the difference between the observed futures prices and
the rational expectation of future spot price. The latter depends on the risk price parameter which is thought as an affine function of the latent variables.
To estimate an affine term structure model we postulate the existence of three factors.
The first-two factors represent level and slope of the nearest three futures contracts while
the third factor is usually interpreted as measurement error.
Data are collected such that the maturity of futures contracts changes with each observation. Thus, implementation of the term structure model only requires oil futures prices
collected in an unbalanced dataset in which the panel structure is given by different maturities and the monthly time-series dimension is made by the futures price on the last
day of each week.
Following Hamilton and Wu (2012) the set of parameters included in the affine term
structure model can be derived by applying the method of minimum-chi-square estimation (MCSE) to the unrestricted reduced form estimates. In this way it is possible to
infer the crude oil risk premium as difference between the oil futures price based on the
structural parameters under risk-neutrality assumptions and the observed oil futures price
that characterize the real world dynamic.

1

Figure 1 plots four alternative estimates of the risk premium based on the methodologies
and the specifications that have been previously discussed. Two basic futures emerge.
First, significant similarities can be seen between the pairs of risk premium estimates.
In particular, the first and the second measures of risk premium have high positive correlation (0.93) over the entire sample. This becomes stronger (0.96) from January 2000
to April 2016. Moreover the risk premium estimate implied by the affine term structure
(4)

(3)

model, rpt+3 , is positively correlated with rpt+3 . In particular their correlation ranges
from 0.32 (January 1984 - April 2016) to 0.46 (January 2000 - April 2016).
Second, the last two measures of crude oil risk premium document a systematic downward
shift of their average level.
1

Hamilton and Wu (2012) show that the MCSE minimizes a quadratic form in the difference between the reduced-form parameters implied by the structural model and the ols estimates derived from
the reduced-form model. The quadratic form corresponds to the information matrix and the MCSE is
asymptotically equivalent to full-information maximum likelihood estimator.

9
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Figure 1: Risk premium regression estimates.
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Note: Figure 1 plots the risk premium estimates across different specifications and
methodologies over the period January 1990 - April 2016.
Following Baumeister and Kilian (2016) the accuracy of risk premium estimate is reflected
by the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) ratio between the rational expectation of
future spot price and the random-walk process.
Rational expectations of future spot price equals the futures prices adjusted for the crude
oil risk premium. A case of MSPE ratio below one indicates an improvement in the accuracy of the random-walk process.
Table 2 reports the predictive accuracy of risk-adjusted futures price and the statical
significance of the MSPE reduction based on the test of Clark and West (2007).
Table 2: Predictive accuracy of risk-adjusted futures price.
Risk premium Mean squared prediction ratio p-value
RP1
0.92
0.03
RP2
0.95
0.03
RP3
0.88
0.05
RP4
0.82
0.02

3.2

Stylised facts on the crude oil futures market

Broadly speaking, participants in the oil futures market can be classified into three categories: hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs.
10
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The hedgers have economic interests in the physical market and they hedge against price
risks by holding opposite positions in the spot and futures markets at the same time.
For example, an oil producer can lock in the price of crude oil production by selling a
certain amount of futures contracts in anticipation of a later spot market sale. In contrast,
an oil consumer can hedge against rising crude oil prices by buying a given number of
futures contracts in anticipation of an actual physical market purchase. Although hedging
activities represent the simplest way to manage price risks they could also affect the total
revenues accruing to both consumers and producers.
The oil speculators are not interested in making (or taking) delivery of the commodity
in the physical market but they buy (or sell) paper barrels to make profits as an opportunity for a capital gain in anticipation of price changes or as component of a diversified
portfolio.
For example, the Commodity Pool Operators (CPO’s) are investment vehicles that collect
capital from a large number of investors, through a public or private offering, in order to
facilitate investment opportunities in a portfolio of commodity futures.
The CPO’s usually delegate the Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA’s) who are professional money managers able to engage futures transactions in the derivative markets.
Analogously the hedge funds invest on behalf of rich people in conjunction with other
investment products like stocks, currencies and bonds.
As a result the participation of financial institutions such as banks, hedge, mutual and
pension funds, money managers can add liquidity to crude oil futures market serving as
a counterparty for the hedgers.
The arbitrageurs are the third class of actors who attempt to eliminate any markets’ price
discrepancies.
All categories above mentioned are easier to separate in principle than in practice but
their definitions reported in this analysis are consistent with those proposed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The following regulatory agency breaks down the number of outstanding short and long
futures contracts for crude oil on the basis of two macro categories: the ”commercial” and
”non-commercial” firms.
11
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The former include physical participants such as producers, merchants, processors and
end-users that have a direct interest in physical oil production, consumption and trade.
The latter are mainly made by financial participants like money managers and hedge
funds that are interested in trading futures contracts for investment purposes.
In this context commercial firms are considered hedgers while non-commercial firms are
treated as speculative traders.
At first sight it might be questionable to assume that commercial firms are only hedgers.
For example a producer (or consumer) can hedge only a fraction of its physical underlying
taking implicitly a speculative position, see Fattouh et al. (2013).
However, since in this analysis the risk premium is defined as a monetary reward accrued
to speculators for their non-diversifiable risk in the commodity market, it is reasonable to
refer to a non-commercial firm as a speculative trader.
The hedging pressure theory states that the risk premium arises from the interaction between hedgers and speculators and it becomes higher (in absolute value) when the hedging
demand increases.
The open interest represents the number of derivative contracts held by both commercial
and non-commercial firms at the end of a trading day. This is a proxy for the flow of
money injected into the futures market. This implies that the open interest can be used
to define an aggregate measure of hedging (or speculative) pressure.
Therefore we define the net-hedging demand as a ratio between the net and gross positions
of the futures contracts referred to commercial firms. Analogously, the same logic applied
to non-commercial firms yields to a measure of net-speculative demand. This last can be
also interpreted as proxy for net-hedging supply.
Interestingly, the CFTC considers financial institutions called swap dealers as commercial
firms. Although these entities represent investment banks and commodity brokers/dealers,
they act as intermediaries for producers and consumers suggesting that their positions on
futures market should reflect hedging purposes. However, it may not always be obvious
to understand whether swap dealers operate for commercial firms or not. For this reason
we do not include the positions of swap dealers on the derivative market in the definition
of hedging pressure measure.
12
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Figure 2: Hedging pressure indicators.
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Note: Figure 2 plots the WTI spot prices combined with the hedging pressure indicators
over the period January 2006 - April 2016. Green histograms refer to the net-hedging
demand from commercial firms. Negative values indicate that hedgers are net-short. Pink
histograms refer to the net-speculative demand from money managers. Positive values
indicate that speculators are net-long.
Figure 2 plots the monthly WTI spot price combined with the net positions held by both
the hedgers and the speculators.
It is important to note that an investor might hold both long and short positions in the
futures market. In particular for every contract that one trader is long there is another
trader who is short such that the outstanding value of long and short futures contract is
exactly offsetting.
Figure 2 shows that on average the hedgers are net-short and speculators are net-long.
Interestingly, hedgers seem to follow price trend: they increase their net-short positions
when the spot price falls and move from short to long positions when spot price rises. On
the other hand, speculators seem to change their positions in the futures market with the
object to replicate the spot price of oil, providing market liquidity.
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4

Econometric method

The methodology is based on a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (BSVAR) model
inspired by Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b). In this section we provide an economic
explanation for each of the structural equations and the corresponding informative prior
distributions. Further details of the identification strategy and the Bayesian algorithm as
proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) are reported in Appendix A.
The SVAR model is the following:

Ayt = c +

24
X

Bj yt−j + vt

(5)

j=1

where A is the matrix of instantaneous structural parameters and c is the vector of constant terms. The vector of endogenous variables is yt and it includes the percent change
in global crude oil production (qt ), the global real economic activity (reat ), the real price
of crude oil (pt ) and the crude oil risk premium (rpt ). The structural representation
considered in 5 is based on a system of four equations:

qt = aq,p pt + b̃1 xt−1 + v1t

(6)

reat = area,q qt + area,p pt + b̃2 xt−1 + v2t

(7)

pt = ap,q qt + ap,rea reat + b̃3 xt−1 + v3t

(8)

rpt = arp,q qt + arp,rea reat + arp,p pt + b̃4 xt−1 + v4t

(9)

where b̃1 , b̃2 , b̃3 and b̃4 are row vectors of structural lagged coefficients 2 related to the firstfour equations and xt−1 is a column vector including a constant and the past variables.
The oil supply equation is given by 6. It is a function of only one contemporaneous
structural parameter aq,p which represents the short-run price elasticity of oil supply.
The real economic activity modelled in equation 7 is instantaneously affected by the global
oil production and the real price of crude oil due to area,q and area,p , respectively.
2

The generic b̃i contains all structural lagged coefficients of the ith equation belongs to the first row
of Bj , for j = 1, · · · , 24. In other words, b̃i has a dimension (n × m + 1) where n and m are the numbers
of endogenous variables and lags, respectively.
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The inverse demand function of the global market for crude oil is defined in equation 8
where ap,q represents the reciprocal of short-run price elasticity of oil demand.
Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b) the structural coefficient ap,rea is the ratio
between the income elasticity (derived from the real economic activity index) and the
short run price elasticity.
The risk premium estimate modelled in equation 9 is contemporaneously affected by all
endogenous variables that are considered in this analysis.
Finally vt = (v1t , v2t , v3t , v4t )0 denotes a vector of structural innovations with the following
variance covariance structure: Et (vt vt0 ) = D and Et (vt vs0 ) = 0 if t 6= s. The fact that D is
a diagonal matrix implies that the structural shocks can be economically interpreted in
terms of shifts in demand and supply.
In particular, the first shock (v1t ), oil supply shock, is the unexpected changes in the
global oil production. The second shock (v2t ), aggregate demand shock, reflects a rise in
the demand for crude oil and other industrial commodities driven by fluctuations in the
global business cycle. The third shock (v3t ), precautionary demand shock, is related to a
unanticipated change in the demand for crude oil for future consumption.
Finally, the fourth shock (v4t ) is called risk premium shock and it is designed to capture
unexpected changes in the risk premium which is not driven by the first-three structural
shocks. For example, it might reflect an increase in the price of risk and/or capital
constraints, difficulty to achieve a diversified investment portfolio, and the existence of
profitable opportunities from other markets.
The matrix summarizing the simultaneous relations among the endogenous variables can
be denoted as follow:


1
0
−aq,p


−area,q
1
−area,p

A=

1
 −ap,q −ap,rea

−arp,q −arp,rea −arp,p


0


0



0

1

(10)

The first row of A characterizes the oil supply equation, as reported in 6. We postulate
that the global oil production does not respond to any changes in the economic activity
and crude oil risk premium, within the same period. Therefore an instantaneous increase
15
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in the global crude oil production is only caused by a rise in the price of oil reflected
by aq,p , for which we assign student t(cq,p , σq,p , νq,p ) positive truncated distribution, with
mode at cq,p = 0.0258, scale parameter σq,p = 0.2 and degrees of freedom νq,p = 3.
The magnitude of the prior mode is very small in absolute value which is consistent with
the assumption of a price inelastic supply curve, which is motivated by the existence of
large production cost of the oil sector, see Pindyck (1994, 2001) and Kilian and Murphy
(2014). The second row of A includes the structural parameters of the real economic activity equation. We remain agnostic about the prior beliefs of area,q and area,p . We postulate
that changes in crude oil risk premium do not instantaneously affect the real economic
activity. For both coefficients we put relative uninformative prior student t distribution
with mode at crea,q = 0, scale parameter σrea,q = 0.2 and νrea,q = 3 degrees of freedom. As
regards the structural parameter area,p we truncate the prior distribution to be negative
consistent with the view that an increase in the real price of oil causes a reduction of the
economic activity, see for example Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2014).
In matrix 10 the structural coefficient ap,q represents the reciprocal of short run price elasticity of oil demand. Therefore we put a student t(cp,q , σp,q , νp,q ) prior distribution with
mode at cp,q = −3, scale parameter σ31 = 0.1 , ν31 = 3 degrees of freedom and truncated
to be negative. We expect that the short price elasticity of oil demand is lower than its
long-run estimate as discussed in Hausman and Newey (1995).
As regards the income elasticity of oil demand there are several estimates that range from
0.4 to 1, see Gately and Huntington (2002) and Csereklyei and Stern (2016).
In this analysis we postulate that the income elasticity (derived from the real economic
activity index) is greater than the short run price demand elasticity. Thus their ratio
is greater than one and we assign student t(c32 , σ32 , ν32 ) prior distribution with mode at
c32 = 1.4, scale parameter σ31 = 0.2 , ν32 = 3 degrees of freedom and truncated to be
positive.
Given the forward-looking nature of the risk premium we impose an exclusion restriction
on the structural coefficient ap,rp .
Finally for the parameters of the risk premium equation we assign completely uninformative priors t student distribution, with location parameter ci = 0, scale σi = 100 and
16
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degrees of freedom ν = 3. The prior density of matrix A is given by the product of all
student t densities of each structural parameter subject to the sign restrictions previously
discussed.
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5

Empirical results

In this section we proceed to the analysis of the dynamic responses of the endogenous
variables to each structural shock. The shocks have been normalized such that they imply an increase in the real price of oil.
Figure 3 plots the median impulse responses of oil production, real economic activity and
price of oil to the three oil supply and oil demand shocks together with the corresponding
pointwise 68% percentiles of the posterior distribution. All empirical results are reported
for the specification including the crude oil risk premium estimated by adopting the affine
term structure model as discussed in Hamilton and Wu (2014).

3

The impulse response estimates imply that an unexpected oil supply disruption causes a
contemporaneous drop of the global crude oil production. This shock is associated with
an increase in the price of oil and a decline in the real economic activity, on impact.
An unanticipated positive aggregate demand shock causes an instantaneous increase in
the real economic activity, in the global oil production and in the real price of crude oil.
Finally a positive precautionary demand shock causes a contemporaneous increase in the
global oil production accompanied by an hump-shaped response of the real price of oil.
The impact response of the real economic activity to a positive precautionary demand
shock is negative.
Figure 3 suggests that the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to each structural shock are consistent with the empirical results of Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy
(2014); Kilian and Lee (2014) and Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b).
Figure 4 shows empirical evidence that an unexpected increase in the real price of oil
triggered by an oil supply disruption and positive aggregate and precautionary demand
shocks is associated with a contemporaneous decline in the oil futures risk premium.
This result reflects several economic features. First, the expected speculative gains (hence,
the crude oil risk premium) decrease as current oil prices increase.
This is consistent with the fact that higher oil prices require that speculators allocate
more capital to purchase the same amount of contracts, causing the marginal value of the
3

Notice that, the sign and the path of the impulse response functions are robust across different
measures of crude oil risk premium.
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investment to decrease. Suppose that the oil futures curve is upward sloping and the price
to purchase a futures contract for a given maturity is $60. Now, imagine that the spot
price of crude oil is $30, the storage cost at the net of the convenience yield is, say, 3%
of the nominal futures price and the risk-free interest rate is 5%. Thus, oil traders would
borrow $30, buy oil in the physical market and store it at the cost of $2 until the delivery
date. As a result the total cost for the investor is $33.5 and the expected profit will be
$26.5.
Now we assume that a shock causes an increase in the spot price of oil up to $100. The
same shock also causes and an upward-shift of the futures curve so that futures price is
$130. In this case the total cost for the investor will be higher than before, reaching $108
while the expected long returns will be equal to $21.7, amounting to a 35% reduction.
Second, it is not surprising to find out that when the term structure of the oil future curve
is in contango a very large number of speculators increases their long position in these
contracts because they expect that the price of oil will be higher in the future. As a result
the increase in the speculative purchase of futures contract and hence, the competition
among oil speculators, might cause a decline of the average prospective return in the crude
oil futures market.
Moreover, it is important to note that the decline of the risk premium might be reinforced
by a reduction in the short-hedging demand of commercial firms. Although every hedging
strategy implies an off-setting gain between spot and financial markets, it is well known
that higher levels of oil prices might lead to a reduction of the incentive to hedge against
price drops. This is motivated by a higher return than one hedgers would receive if they
did not hedge.
This conjecture is consistent with the view that crude oil risk premium is higher when
net-short hedging demand is higher as discussed in Acharya and Ramadorai (2013). This
implies that during a high level of oil prices an increase in the hedging supply from speculators and/or a reduction in the hedging demand from commercial firms might cause a
drop of the crude oil risk premium.
Third, the growing interests in commodity futures contract as an asset class for portfolio
investment have attracted attention of many arbitrageurs causing the arbitrage profits to
20
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increase and the risk premium earned by oil speculators to decline, as discussed in Duffie
(2010) and Etula (2013).
The average excess return of a crude oil futures investment consists of a spot return and
a roll return. The spot return is simply the appreciation (or depreciation) of the futures
contract held to maturity. The roll-return (or roll-yield) arises when investors want to
maintain a crude oil futures position. This can be easily done, by selling the expiring contract and use the proceed to buy another futures contract for delivery at a more distant
date.
In the case of backwardated market oil speculators can earn a positive roll-yield, even if
the spot price does not change. However the roll-yield (and hence the crude oil risk premium received by the oil speculators) could partially decline because of the arbitrageurs’
attempt to eliminate any possible mispricing triggered by index funds or other types of
speculators during the rolling period.
Even if provisionally, roll yield opportunities for commodity investors might cause a reduction of the expiring futures price, below its equilibrium. Conversely the buying pressure
of the next-to-expire contracts might cause a rise above the their economic fundamental
prices.
As a result, a market price anomaly could be easily exploited by a long-short strategy
from the arbitrageurs. They can simultaneously short the nearby maturity contract and
long the more distant one by earning a profit from the calendar spread. The arbitrageurs
will close-out their positions by longing the short-maturity contract and shorting the longmaturity contract.
Basically, the arbitrageurs’ gain causes a drop of the crude oil risk premium which is
mainly reflected by the decline of the roll-yield.
In general crude oil plays a primary role in determining the performance of a commodity
index or for financial portfolios. Thus, understanding the path response of crude oil risk
premium to unexpected changes in the price of oil can help how best to perform forward
looking asset allocation analysis. In order to define a proper set of forward-looking efficient frontiers, oil speculators should combine assets weight and forecasts return at the
net of the risk premium reduction, as documented in this analysis.
21
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Figure 4 shows that the crude oil risk premium responds to oil price shocks differently,
depending on the cause behind the shocks.
An oil supply disruption causes a slight decline in the risk premium but much of the initial
drop is reversed within the first ten months.
A positive aggregate demand shock, driven by unexpected fluctuation in the global business cycle, causes a large reduction in the crude oil risk premium. In the global economy
if the aggregate demand expands quickly then we would expect to see a rise in the level
of inflation. Although numerous studies document that commodity diversified portfolios
represent one of the best ways to hedge against inflation risks our results suggest that
the efficacy of this strategy could be adversely affected by the reduction of crude oil risk
premium.
A positive precautionary demand shock causes a persistent reduction of the risk premium.
According to Kilian (2009) and Alquist and Kilian (2010) this shock might reflect an unanticipated increase in the demand for storage. The latter might provide useful information
about what the term structure of futures prices will look like in the future.
Our results suggest that whenever the shape of the term structure is downward-sloping
because of a positive precautionary demand shock the crude oil risk premium earned by
a long investor could decline, even during backwardated futures market.
In general the response of the crude oil risk premium to demand shocks is greater than the
supply shocks. Moreover, precautionary and aggregate demand shocks produce similarly
effects on the risk premium.
Figure 5 plots the median impulse response of the endogenous variables to different
proxies for positive risk premium shock.
The first piece of evidence is that the oil risk premium is the only variable to increase in
response to unanticipated positive risk premium shocks.
Other macroeconomic and global oil market variables are not simultaneously affected by
the risk premium shock, according to the identification structure implied by the model.
For this reason, risk premium shocks are not driven by economic fundamentals, as is typical of the global market for crude oil. For commercial firms positive shocks to the risk
premium reflect a rise in the cost of hedging for reasons that are independent from the
23
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global market for crude oil. Figure 5 shows that, beyond the impact period, an unanticipated positive risk premium shock causes a rise in the real price of oil only for the
first-two risk premium estimates.
In contrast to previous structural shocks this result provides evidence of a positive relationship between the price of oil and the risk premium upon impact.
However this result does not hold for the last-two risk premium estimates. Therefore the
effects of positive risk premium shocks on the real price of oil upon the impact period is
mixed.
Interestingly, when the estimation of the crude oil risk premium is performed by linear
regression model positive risk premium shocks cause price, production and real economic
activity to increase.
In the case where the risk premium estimate is derived from the term affine structure
model there is little evidence that shocks to risk premium cause significant changes in the
endogenous variables of the global market for crude oil.
Figure 6 plots the historical decomposition of the crude oil risk premium and the real
price of oil with 68% posterior credible set. There is empirical evidence that, from early
2003 until mid-2008, shocks to aggregate demand (likely driven by Emerging Asia and
OECD countries) have represented the main economic factors behind the decline of the
oil futures risk premium.
This implies that economic fundamentals represent the rational drivers behind any investment strategy taken on by speculators, which direct impacts the aggregate measure for
crude oil risk premium.
It is important to point out that this finding is still consistent with the claim that the
growth of commodity index investments have caused a reduction in the crude oil risk
premium during the financialization of commodity markets.
Interestingly, the historical effect of the risk premium shocks on the real price of oil is
negligible. This result tells us that specific shocks to speculators (independent from the
aggregate demand and/or supply of oil) were not the main drivers in explaining the path
of the real price of oil, during the financialization of commodity markets. This is consistent with the empirical results of Kilian and Lee (2014).
25
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The role of speculation in driving the oil prices became very popular and important for
policy implications when the spot price of oil dropped from historic highs of $144 in July
2008 to $33, five months later.
In the first half of 2008, figure 6 provides indication that the drop of the crude oil risk
premium was associated with an increase in the real price of oil mainly driven by shocks
to precautionary demand for oil. They were triggered by a full of exogenous events, as
discussed in Smith (2009). For example, in March 2008 there was the sabotages of the
two main oil export pipelines in the south of Iraq, in April 2008 the strike of Nigerian
union workers and finally, in June 2008 there was the closure of the North Forties pipeline
in the UK and the mass rioting in Nigeria.
Figure 7 plots the hedging pressure indicator six months before crude oil reached a peak
of $147 per barrel in July 2008, an all-time high.
The significant increase in the price of oil caused a reduction of the net-hedging demand
from commercial firms followed by a decline of the crude oil risk premium paid to the
speculators as a form insurance against down-trended prices.
On the other side, higher oil prices required more money to invest in the futures market to
buy the same amount of contracts. This caused a reduction in the crude oil risk premium.
Moreover figure 2 shows that positive precautionary demand shocks were partially responsible for the reduction of crude oil risk premium between 2010 and 2012. These shocks
might be triggered by some concerns about possible international oil supply disruptions.
According to Bastianin et al. (2017) the negative oil supply shock caused by Libyan civil
war of February 2011 took about 1.5 million barrels per day off the global market. Then,
the political tensions related to Iran’s nuclear program lead to the European Union foreign
ministers to agree on a ban on the transport, purchase and import into Europe of Iranian
crude oil.
In early 2012, the Europe’s sovereign debt crisis represented another possible factor that
contributed to decline the crude oil risk premium through precautionary demand shocks.
On the other hand, a sequence of positive and negative aggregate demand shocks was
responsible for high level of risk premium until the end of 2013. As a result the effect of
precautionary and aggregate demand shocks on oil risk premium was offsetting.
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Between June and December 2014, the drop of the price of crude oil caused a systematic upward trend of the oil risk premium, which was mainly caused by a combination of
unanticipated positive shocks to the global oil production and negative aggregate demand
shocks. The latter could reflect the unexpected slowdown of the global economy, mainly
driven by the decline of the Chinese manufacturing industry, as reported by the Caixin
manufacturing index.
Figure 7: Hedging pressure indicators.
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6

Conclusions

The benefit of including oil futures contracts as an asset of financial investment portfolio
is widely accepted in both the academic literature and the oil industry.
Crude oil futures contracts allow investors to get more attractive portfolio’s diversification
with a higher ratio of return to risk than traditional investments made of equities and
bonds, only.
Therefore if the current futures price is below the expected future spot price, arbitrage
mechanism implies convergence of the futures price to the spot price at maturity and this
turns into positive excess returns.
The expected returns of crude oil futures investment represent simply bets because spot
and roll returns follow an uncertain scenario. However, a possible way to derive a forwardlooking measure of risk premium relies on the impulse response estimates implied by the
SVAR model proposed in this analysis.
Moreover, impulse response analysis suggests the existence of a negative relationship between the impact responses of the real price of oil and oil futures risk premium to shocks
of the economic fundamentals of the global oil market. As a consequence investors could
exploit these findings as an asset allocation strategy.
Finally, we highlight that the main economic factors behind the historical decline of the
risk premium can be explained by shocks to aggregate and precautionary demand for
crude oil.
In this way the effects of the financialization of commodity markets on the risk premium
are modelled endogenously with respect to the global market for crude oil.
Our results suggest that shocks to economic fundamentals play a crucial role in explaining
the path of the oil futures risk premium. They are also more important than specific shocks
to the non-diversifiable component of the long investors. This confirms the economic idea
that oil speculators do not represent mindless traders.
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Appendix A

Identification strategy

This section reports a short description of the algorithm proposed by Baumeister and
Hamilton (2015a) for the estimation of model 5, under a Bayesian perspective. The
implementation of the estimation algorithm is based on three main steps.
First stage consists of a specification of informative prior beliefs, represented in form of
density functions about the matrix A, the vector collecting the structural disturbances vt
and the matrix Bj , for j = 1, · · · , 12.
Prior for the elements of the contemporaneous structural matrix that are not known with
certainty are collected in a vector (α). Thus, let p(A) be the joint prior distribution which
is made by the product of Student t distributions of the elements collected in α. Then, we
need to specify priors for the inverse diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix
of the structural errors D conditional on A. The priors for d−1
ii (which denotes the element
in row and column i of matrix D) conditional on A is given by a Γ(κi , τi ) distribution, as
follow:
p(D|A) =

n
Y

p(dii |A)

(11)

i=1

where κi /τi and κi /τi2 represent the first and second moments of d−1
ii , respectively. Notice
that, the parameter τi depends on A whereas ki does not.
Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a) we calibrate the diagonal elements of D
from the residuals obtained by running ols regressions from the univariate autoregressive
models of order 12. Moreover, we set the prior mean for d−1
ii equals to the reciprocal of the
diagonal element of a matrix ASA0 , where S represents the sample variance covariance
matrix of the univariate autoregressive models performed for each time-series.
We postulate b̃i is a row vector of random structural coefficients following a conditional
normal multivariate distribution, b̃i |A, D ∼ N (mi , dii Mi ) where mi can be interpreted as
the best guess about b̃i before seeing the data and Mi represents the level of uncertainty
about the standard Minnesota prior.
We follow the approach proposed by Doan et al. (1984) in which the behaviour for a
generic time-series can be represented by a random walk process with mi = 0 and great
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confidence to expect that coefficients related to higher lags are zero.

4

In the end, the joint probability distribution of the prior information about the plausible
values of the parameters is defined as:

p(A, D, Bj ) = p(A)p(D|A)p(Bj |A, D)

for j = 1, 2, ..., 24

(12)

In the second step, the Baumeister and Hamilton (2015a)’s algorithm searches for a vector
of values α̂ that solves numerically a maximization problem of the target function q(α).
Thus, the vector α̂ provides a reasonable guess for the posterior mean of α while the
matrix of second derivatives of q(α) with respect to α = α̂ exploits information about the
shape of the posterior distribution of α.
In other words, the second stage sets the initial values for the elements of A in order
to inform the random-walk Metropolis Hasting algorithm, that is performed in the third
step.
The last stage is designed to construct the joint posterior distribution of the parameters,
that is p(A, D, B|YT ), where YT represents the sample-data. According to Baumeister and
Hamilton (2015a) we proceed as follow.
First, we use the Metropolis Hasting algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution of the contemporaneous structural matrix, that is p(A|YT ). The iteration starts
setting α1 = α̂ and for a generic step l + 1 we generate a candidate α̃(l+1) as a sum of αl
and the product between three components: (1) a vector of independent standard student
t variables with 2 degrees of freedom, (2) a scalar tuning parameter for 30% acceptance
ratio and (3) the Cholesky factorization of the matrix capturing the curvature of the posterior distribution of the vector of unknowns parameters A.
Then, we compare the value of the target function evaluated in α̃(l+1) and α(l) , respectively.
If q(α̃(l+1) ) < q(α(l) ), we set α(l+1) = α(l) with probability 1 − exp[q(α̃(l+1) − q(α(l+1) )];
otherwise we set α(l+1) = α̃(l+1) . The value l indicates the number of iterations with the
4

Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015b) we need to set three different values for the hyperparameters of the random walk prior for the lagged coefficients. Thus, we set the parameter controlling
the overall tightness of the prior to 0.5. We set the parameter that governs how quickly the prior for
lagged coefficients tightness to zero as lag increase to 1. Finally, we put prior on the parameter governing
the tightness of the prior for the constant term to 100. The latter is used to make the prior on the
constant term irrelevant.
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first D burn-in draws included. Thus, starting with l = D + 1, for each αl we generate
δiil ∼ Γ(ki∗ , τi∗ (A(αl ))) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and take Dl to be diagonal matrix whose elements
dlii = 1/δiil .
Finally, from the posterior distribution of the variance covariance matrix of the structural
error terms we can further generate b̃li ∼ N (m∗i , dlii Mi∗ ) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where b̃li is the
row vector of lagged structural parameters referred to the ith variable.
In the end, the triple {A(αl ), Dl , B l }D+N
l=D+1 represents a sample size N of posterior distribution:
p(A, D, B|YT ) = p(A|YT )p(D|A, YT )p(B|A, D, YT ))

(13)

with the first D burn-in draws equals to 200.000 and N = 200.000.
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